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he third Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit at Vilnius on November 28-29th could have 
spurred a ‘Thessaloniki moment’ for the post-Soviet countries bordering the EU’s 
eastern periphery, but it failed to deliver. The analogy refers to the 2003 Summit 
between the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans, at which the latter were offered a 
clear prospect of future integration with the EU. But instead of defining the geopolitical 
finalité of EU-EaP relations by projecting a path towards future accession to the EU for 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the initial ambition for the 
Vilnius Summit was thwarted.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU constructed its relations with the Eastern 
neighbours on the basis of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). All of these 
accords (except the one with Belarus) entered into force in the second half of the 1990s for a 
period of 10 years and have been automatically renewed since the expiry of their first period 
of validity. In 2004, the agreements were enveloped into the wider European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) and the bilateral action plans developed jointly by the EU and each of the 
neighbouring countries. The action plans are ‘benchmarked roadmaps’ aimed at introducing 
reforms needed to bring the neighbours closer to the EU. Whereas the policy developed to 
match new realities, the static contractual relations gradually went out of date. In the wake of 
the inaugural EaP Summit in Prague in May 2009 and the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty later that same year, the EU has been working to upgrade both its bilateral and 
multilateral relations with the Eastern neighbours. The flagship document underpinning 
each newly defined bilateral relationship is the Association Agreement (AA), which includes 
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).  
After more than three years of negotiations, Moldova and Georgia initialled their respective 
AAs/DCFTAs with the EU at Vilnius. However, after intense pressure from Russia, the 
Armenian and Ukrainian Presidents abandoned negotiations with the EU before the Summit 
took place.1 In response, the EU – pushed by some of its member states – watered down the 
                                                   
1 See M. Emerson and H. Kostanyan, “Putin’s grand design to destroy the EU’s Eastern Partnership 
and replace it with a disastrous neighbourhood policy of his own”, CEPS Commentary, 17 September 
2013. 
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final declaration of the Summit. Whereas an early draft declaration acknowledged the 
sovereign right of each of the six Eastern Partnership states to choose the scope of its 
ambitions and final goal of its relations with the European Union and to decide “whether to 
remain partners in accordance with Article 8 of the Treaty of the European Union [TEU] or 
follow its European aspirations in accordance with Article 49 thereof” 
(http://www.rferl.org/content/eu-neighbors-eastern-statement/25153908.html), the EU 
removed the reference to Article 49 from the final version. As a result, the Vilnius Summit 
fell far short of serving as a ‘rite de passage’ towards full integration with the EU. 
To be sure, the fact that some member states succeeded in eliminating Article 49 from the 
declaration need not mean an end to the membership dream of some of the Eastern 
neighbours. Indeed, the language employed in the joint declaration is fuzzy enough to allow 
EaP countries to find support from the EU to materialise their wish to move beyond 
neighbourhood status: “The participants reaffirm the particular role for the Partnership to 
support those who seek an ever closer relationship with the EU. The Association 
Agreements, including DCFTAs, are a substantial step in this direction.” Arguably, the 
phrase “ever closer relationship” can be read in the Thessaloniki spirit, in the sense that the 
Eastern Partnership provides the framework for the “European course of the [EaP] countries, 
all the way to their future accession”. 
This interpretation is confirmed if one considers that the summit declaration is only one 
element of the EU’s substantive offer to the EaP countries. As we argue elsewhere, a close 
reading of the AAs/DCFTAs and a comparative analysis of their material substance with 
that of the most recent Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) reveals that in 
many aspects (e.g. rights and obligations, timeframes for the reduction of duties and the 
uniform application of standards and the harmonisation of laws), the agreements with EaP 
countries are more advanced than the pre-accession agreements of the countries of the 
Western Balkans.2 Leaving the rhetoric in the preambles and the political part of the AAs 
aside, the DCFTAs and the sectoral cooperation exhibit a large number of legally binding 
commitments that exceed those in the SAAs both in scope of coverage and level of 
enforcement.  
For instance, the AA with Ukraine includes commitments in most so-called ‘WTO+’ policy 
areas – technical barriers to trade (TBTs), customs administration, intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) and trade in services – that far outweigh those enshrined in the SAA for Serbia, which 
is (at least in theory) reciprocated by wider and faster access to the EU market in industrial 
goods. Importantly, some “WTOx” policy areas (competition, energy) are covered by a 
sophisticated dispute settlement mechanism in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement to 
embolden their legal enforceability, whereas such arrangements are missing in the SAA with 
Serbia. Furthermore, other provisions of WTOx policy areas (environment, transport, 
employment, etc.) prescribe the transposition of the EU acquis into Ukraine’s legislation 
according to strict schedules set out in the AA’s annexes. 
This shows the blurred boundaries between the material substance of the most prestigious 
instruments aimed at contractually defining EU relations with different categories of Eastern 
European countries. In our view, the EU might not be able to legitimately maintain the 
political schism between its ‘enlargement’ and ‘enlargement minus’ (i.e. European 
Neighbourhood) policies. Indeed, the Eastern partners that sign, ratify and implement the 
AA/DCFTA will effectively be treated as more than just neighbours of the EU in the sense of 
Article 8 TEU, even if no explicit membership perspective is enshrined in their agreement.  
                                                   
2 S. Blockmans, H. Kostanyan and I. Vorobiov, “Eastern Partnership: More than neighbours”, CEPS 
Essay, forthcoming. 
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Moldova and Georgia may move in that direction, despite the likelihood that they will come 
under more aggressive pressure from Russia in the coming months. The threat of stricter 
Russian immigration policy could see thousands of Moldovans and Georgians expelled; 
more trade sanctions could be employed by Russia; and new tensions in the breakaway 
republics of Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia may lead to a worsening of the 
security situation after the winter Olympics in Sochi.  
The EU’s offer of the AA/DCFTA remains on the table for Ukraine. The public anger and 
mass protests against Russia’s role in persuading Yanukovich not to sign the AA/DCFTA 
with the EU has made it all but impossible for the Ukrainian President to take the alternative 
route offered by the Kremlin, i.e. joining the customs union with Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. Any compromise with the protesters would have to revive the AA/DCFTA and 
reduce Russia’s sway. 
For all the reasons mentioned above, the EU and its member states should not miss another 
opportunity to fully embrace the Eastern partners’ European choice and match such action 
with an unequivocal offer of a framework leading all the way to the future accession of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to the EU.  
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